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Original Article
Scholars have been interested in the relevance of conspirato-
rial beliefs to the political process for many decades. 
Hofstadter (1964) provides, perhaps, the most definitive 
description of what he called “the paranoid style”—the ten-
dency to see grand conspiracies against one’s culture or way 
of life as major motivating forces of history. Hofstadter 
traces the paranoid style from anti-Masonic and anti-Catho-
lic movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
through the anti-communist paranoia that gripped the nation 
in the mid–twentieth century. More recent research has 
offered similar definitions, such as Oliver and Wood 
(2014:952), who define conspiracy theories as “narratives 
about hidden, malevolent groups secretly perpetuating politi-
cal plots and social calamities to further their own nefarious 
goals.” Uscinski and Parent (2014) add that conspiracy theo-
ries differ from conspiracies in that they are not endorsed by 
epistemic authorities. This research has shown that conspir-
acy theories are still widely believed by the American public 
across a broad variety of issues and that these beliefs are held 
by Americans of all political ideologies and education levels 
(Oliver and Wood 2014; Uscinski and Parent 2014). 
Additionally, other research has raised concerns that belief in 
some conspiracy theories can have potentially deleterious 
social and political consequences (Jolley and Douglas 2014; 
Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis 2010) such as decreased political 
efficacy and support for policies that are not supported by 
expert communities.
While there has been a considerable amount of research 
on belief in conspiracy theories and conspiratorial ideation, 
the majority of it has focused on the individual psychology 
and characteristics of those who believe in conspiracy theo-
ries as well as the social-psychological processes that account 
for the diffusion of such theories through social networks. 
While this work is important, it is also important to move 
beyond individual explanations of conspiratorial ideation 
and further develop an understanding of the social conditions 
that underlie conspiratorial belief that focuses on macro-
level social conditions and structural change.
The analysis in this article attempts to advance the litera-
ture on conspiracy theories by using aggregate state-level 
data on Google search patterns to examine interest in two 
popular sets of conspiracy theories: those relating to the 
“Illuminati” and those relating to the citizenship of President 
Obama across U.S. states between the years 2007 and 2014. 
Conspiracy theories focusing on the Illuminati are included 
as these theories are employed by a diverse array of groups 
and cover a wide range of topics not specific to any one ideo-
logical or partisan group. Conspiracy theories surrounding 
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Abstract
Scholars have recently become increasingly interested in understanding the prevalence and persistence of conspiratorial 
beliefs among the public as recent research has shown such beliefs to be both widespread and to have deleterious 
effects on the political process. This article seeks to develop a sociological understanding of the structural conditions 
that are associated with conspiratorial belief. Using aggregate Google search data to measure public interest in two 
popular political conspiracy theories, the findings indicate that social conditions associated with threat and insecurity, 
including unemployment, changes in partisan control of government, and demographic changes, are associated with 
increased conspiratorial ideation.
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Obama’s citizenship, on the other hand, relate to a specific 
politician and are highly partisan in nature. By studying both 
highly generalized and highly specific conspiracy theories, a 
fuller understanding of how and why people endorse con-
spiratorial belief systems can be developed.
Drawing on previous literature that has found that indi-
viduals tend to engage in conspiratorial ideation when 
experiencing feelings of threat or insecurity, the analysis 
looks at potential social sources of insecurity or threat in 
the social and political environment that might motivate 
conspiratorial belief, including partisan changes in control 
of the presidency, immigration, and unemployment. The 
findings indicate that social threat is associated with con-
spiratorial belief at the state level, but the sources of threat 
vary between the two sets of theories with a very broad 
array of threatening conditions being associated with 
Illuminati conspiracy theories and partisan political threat 
being the primary predictor of conspiracy theories sur-
rounding President Obama’s citizenship.
Previous Literature
Much of the existing work on conspiracy theories focuses on 
the individual and social-psychological determinants of con-
spiratorial belief. Many studies have pointed to the existence 
of stable personality characteristics that make one more pre-
disposed to seeing conspiracies behind political and social 
processes. Oliver and Wood (2014) show that conspiratorial 
beliefs are common among the American public and that 
these beliefs are associated with a tendency to believe in the 
power of unseen forces and Manichean narratives. The idea 
that there exist particular personality traits associated with 
conspiratorial belief is echoed by other scholars. Mirowsky 
and Ross (1983) find that paranoia, or “the belief that people 
are conspiring against you and deliberately trying to harm 
you,” (p. 228) is driven in part by an external locus of con-
trol—a psychological tendency to see external forces as 
being responsible for one’s successes or failures. Additionally, 
Goertzel (1994) and Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, and 
Furnham (2010) both find that individuals who believe in 
one conspiracy theory are more likely to believe in others. 
The implication is that these beliefs are motivated by some 
latent psychological propensity toward conspiratorial ide-
ation. Futhermore, Douglas and Sutton (2011) have even 
found that those who are themselves more willing to partici-
pate in conspiracies are more likely to harbor conspiratorial 
beliefs, projecting their own willingness to engage in such 
behavior onto others. Finally, Miller, Saunders, and Farhart 
(2016) find that individuals who are lacking in trust and 
knowledgeable about politics are more likely to engage with 
conspiratorial belief systems. They find that this is particu-
larly true for conservatives in the United States.
Researchers have also argued that misinformation and 
lack of information are associated with conspiratorial belief 
(Kull et al. 2010; Nyhan 2010; Sunstein and Vermeule 2009; 
Warner and Neville-Shepard 2014). However, other work 
seems to undermine the notion that information environ-
ments alone can be responsible for conspiratorial belief. For 
example, Nyhan and Reifler (2010) have found that correct-
ing false beliefs often reinforces rather than dispels these 
beliefs among those who hold them most strongly. Thus, 
while the conspiratorially minded may hold incorrect beliefs, 
there are clearly processes driving conspiratorial ideation 
besides simple lack of access to correct information.
While the existing work that has largely focused on stable 
personality characteristics and information environments is 
useful in understanding why some individuals might be more 
likely than others to believe in conspiracy theories, it does 
not explain variation in levels of conspiratorial ideation 
across social environments and across time. There is another 
line of individual-level research that provides some insight 
into the potential social causes of conspiratorial beliefs. 
Scholars in this line of research have looked at the role of 
individuals’ perceptions and interpretations of their social 
environment in fomenting conspiratorial belief. Sullivan, 
Landau, and Rothschild (2010) argue that individuals who 
perceive their environment to be risky or hazardous will 
often project the myriad of complex hazards that exist in the 
world onto a single individual or group to whom they attri-
bute immense power and sinister motives. The authors argue 
that this process allows individuals to maintain a sense of 
personal control over their environment or at least the sense 
of being able to understand the source of the threat. This ten-
dency often leads to conspiratorial thinking. It follows from 
this that in environments perceived as threatening, uncertain, 
or hostile, conspiratorial belief should be more pronounced.
The notion that the experience of threat and uncertainty 
may be associated with conspiratorial belief has been empiri-
cally supported by other research and has been connected to 
the experience of threatening social conditions. Several 
potentially important social sources of such threat and anxi-
ety have been discussed in previous research, including eco-
nomic stress, social change, and partisan polarization. 
Goertzel (1994) finds that employment insecurity is posi-
tively correlated with conspiratorial ideation at the individ-
ual level. Similarly, Parsons et al. (1999) find that holding a 
subjective impression that the economy is getting worse is 
associated with higher rates of conspiratorial belief. However, 
Uscinski and Parent (2014) call this into question, finding no 
statistically significant effect for the unemployment rate, 
increasing inequality (as measured by the national GINI 
coefficient), or GDP on variation in conspiratorial ideation 
(as measured by New York Times letters to the editor) in the 
United States between 1890 and 2010.
Additionally, past research has pointed to social and 
demographic change as an important social cause of conspir-
atorial belief. Hofstadter (1964), in his historical discussion 
of paranoid and conspiratorial movements, finds that they 
often focus on threats perceived to be associated with recent 
immigrant groups. Additionally, research on other forms of 
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defensive politics, such as reactionary and populist social 
movements, has also found that the cultural threat posed by 
growing minority or immigrant populations is a key driver of 
support for such movements (Gusfield 1963; McVeigh 
1999). However, more recent empirical findings supporting 
the idea that there is a direct connection between demo-
graphic social change and conspiratorial belief have been 
relatively rare. For example, while Uscinski and Parent 
(2014) did find racial differences in conspiratorial predispo-
sitions, with non-whites being more conspiratorial, they 
found no effect for their measures of social change on the 
national rate of conspiratorial belief.
Research has also highlighted the role of partisanship and 
the threat of being out of power as an important condition for 
the development of conspiratorial beliefs (Uscinksi and 
Parent 2014). This research has demonstrated that conspir-
acy theorizing tends to be most common among partisan 
adherents and ideologues whose party is out of power and 
that more conspiracy theories tend to be directed toward the 
party currently in power. In the United States, control of the 
presidency has been shown to be the most important source 
of this partisan threat as it is the most visible and symboli-
cally significant office in the U.S. government (Uscinski and 
Parent 2014).
Uscinki and Parent (2014) propose a theory that attempts 
to integrate the individual-level psychological findings with 
broader political environment. The authors argue that while 
innate disposition toward conspiratorial belief may be con-
stant, different conspiracy theories will rise and fall in popu-
larity according to changes in structural conditions. The 
authors essentially argue that conspiratorial belief is a defen-
sive mechanism used by weak groups against potential 
threats. While the substance of specific theories may be false, 
these theories serve to strengthen in-group solidarity and 
increase vigilance against potential enemies. For this reason, 
conspiratorial belief should increase among groups experi-
encing losses, increased threat, or feelings of vulnerability.
While Uscinski and Parent’s (2014) theoretical formula-
tion represents a major step toward producing a social, as 
opposed to psychological, theory of conspiratorial belief, 
their ability to test their hypotheses is limited by the lack of 
available data measuring conspiratorial belief at levels of 
aggregation higher than that of the individual. This study will 
remedy that situation using a novel data source—data on 
Internet search volumes related to conspiracy theories—to 
study variation in conspiratorial ideation across U.S. states 
between the years 2007 and 2014. Using Internet search data 
from Google Trends, a service that provides aggregate search 
data from Google’s search engine, to measure conspiratorial 
belief and interest provides a major advance over other data 
sources, such as published letters to the editor or survey data, 
in that it is possible to aggregate it to relatively high levels of 
geographic granularity, it is available over time, and the data 
consist of the directly reported interests of individuals in the 
privacy of their own homes. It is not mediated by the editorial 
policies of media outlets or by social desirability bias (for 
a discussion of the attributes of Internet search data, see 
DiGrazia 2015; Stephens-Davidowitz 2014).
This Study
Drawing on research that has found threat and insecurity to 
be motivating factors behind individual-level conspiratorial 
ideation, this research seeks to identify sources of threat in 
the social environment that are tied to macro-level variation 
in conspiratorial belief. Specifically, the social threats ana-
lyzed in this study include changes in partisan control of 
government, unemployment, and immigration. While threats 
relating to employment and partisan control of government 
have been identified in previous work on conspiracy theories 
as being associated with individual-level conspiratorial 
belief, immigration has also been identified as an important 
source of political threat in recent years by other researchers 
(Skocpol and Willliamson 2012).
To test the effect of these sources of threat, a state-level 
longitudinal analysis is conducted using data on Google 
searches relating to two common sets of conspiracy theories: 
those relating to the Illuminati, believed by adherents of 
these theories to be a politically powerful and manipulative 
secret society, and those relating to President Obama’s citi-
zenship or the circumstances of his birth. Interest in these 
conspiracy theories has fluctuated over time in recent years 
and is shown plotted over time in Figure 1. Furthermore, 
there is substantial geographic variability in interest in these 
theories as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 1. Search frequency for Illuminati and Obama birth over 
time.
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Conspiracy Theory Case Studies
The Illuminati
The Illuminati, a purported shadowy group that seeks to 
advance its nefarious interests by intervening in global 
affairs, is the subject of a wide variety of disparate conspir-
acy theories advanced by a large number of ideological 
groups. The historical flexibility of this family of conspiracy 
theories and the multiple meanings it has had for a broad 
variety of social groups throughout history make it a unique 
case for study. In many ways, it has served almost as a 
generic template for conspiratorial belief systems onto 
which nearly any fears or anxieties can be projected.
Modern conspiracy theories surrounding the Illuminati 
trace their origin to the existence of a short-lived eighteenth-
century European secret society called the Bavarian 
Illuminati (Barkun 2013; Hofstadter 1964). Although the 
organization quickly folded under the scrutiny of European 
monarchies and the Catholic Church, it lived on in rumor 
and the imaginations of many citizens during the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, being accused of 
involvement in a wide range of historical events (Barkun 
2013; Hofstadter 1964). Throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, the character of conspiracy theories focused on the 
Illuminati changed and proliferated radically, focusing on 
communism, religious stereotypes, and institutions of 
global governance like the United Nations (Barkun 2013). 
Finally, during the late twentieth century and twenty-first 
century, strands of conspiracy theories about the Illuminati 
involving UFOs, the administration of George H.W. Bush, 
the entertainment industry, the September 11 attacks on 
the World Trade Center and Pentagon, as well as the global 
financial crisis became popular among various subgroups 
(Barkun 2013; Yuhas 2015).
The remarkable flexibility, longevity, and generality of 
conspiracy theories involving the Illuminati make it a 
uniquely valuable case study. Unlike explicitly partisan con-
spiracy theories involving specific actors or political parties 
(e.g., conspiracy theories about President Obama’s citizen-
ship or the complicity of the Bush administration in the 9/11 
attacks), Illuminati conspiracy theories can serve as a generic 
template upon which virtually any conspiratorial anxieties 
can be projected. For these reasons, examining geographic 
variability in belief and interest in the conspiracy over time will 
provide a more complete view of variation in conspiratorial 
Figure 2. Map plots.
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ideation than any of the myriad of more specific conspiracy 
theories that come and go in the public discourse.
Conspiracy Theories about President Obama’s 
Birth Certificate
Beginning during Barack Obama’s first campaign for the 
presidency in 2008, conspiracy theories began to emerge 
about his citizenship and eligibility for the office (Howell 
2012). These conspiracy theories, which came to be popu-
larly known as “birther” conspiracy theories, came in several 
varieties, the most common of which holds that Barack 
Obama was actually secretly born in Kenya rather than the 
United States. According to many adherents of this conspir-
acy theory, evidence purporting to show Obama to have been 
born in Hawaii was fabricated by his parents shortly after his 
birth or later by his campaign or others in anticipation of his 
run for the presidency (Howell 2012). As such, they argue, 
he does not meet the constitutional requirement that the pres-
ident be a “natural born citizen.” This conspiracy theory 
reached a high level of popularity among the public during 
President Obama’s first term in office. For example, accord-
ing to a July 2010 CNN Opinion Research poll, 27 percent of 
all respondents and 41 percent of Republican respondents 
indicated that they believed the President was “probably” or 
“definitely” born in another country (CNN/Opinion Research 
Corporation 2010). Even after the President released his so-
called “long-form” birth certificate in 2011, 13 percent of the 
public continued to believe that the president was probably 
or definitely born in another country, according to Gallup 
(Morales 2011).
Unlike Illuminati conspiracy theories, which are highly 
general and flexible, birther theories are specific to the presi-
dency of Barack Obama and, according to existing research, 
are both highly partisan and highly racialized (Pasek et al. 
2014). This research finds that adherents of birther conspiracy 
theories are overwhelmingly conservative and Republican in 
their partisan affiliations. Additionally, they find that birther 
conspiracy theorists tend to be more likely to hold anti-black 
attitudes than the general public.
Hypotheses. The following hypotheses can be derived from 
the extant literature on conspiracy theories.
Hypothesis 1: State-level economic stress will be associ-
ated with greater interest in conspiratorial belief systems.
Hypothesis 2: Higher rates of international immigration 
will correlate with increased interest in conspiracy 
theories.
Hypothesis 3: The election of President Obama will result 
in greater interest in conspiracy theories among political 
conservatives and partisan Republicans. This should 
result in a larger increase in conspiratorial ideation in con-
servative states compared to liberal states after Obama’s 
election.
Hypothesis 4: There will be higher levels of interest in 
explicitly partisan conspiracy theories in states that are 
more hostile to the political party targeted by the conspir-
acy theory. In this case, more Republican states should 
have higher levels of interest in the conspiracy theory sur-
rounding President Obama’s citizenship.
Data and Methods
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable used in this analysis consists of state-
level measurements based on aggregate Google search pat-
terns associated with the search terms Illuminati and Obama 
birth (see Table A1 in the Appendix for a fuller explanation 
of this term). The data come from Google Trends, a service 
that provides aggregate data on Google search patterns bro-
ken down by geographical areas and time periods. The data 
used in this analysis are divided into four time periods cover-
ing 2007 through 2008, 2009 through 2010, 2011 through 
2012, and 2013 through 2014. The data represent the relative 
frequency with which users of the Google search engine 
search for the terms Illuminati and Obama birth in each state. 
The final time period is excluded for the Obama birth mea-
sure as the frequency of use for that term became too low to 
produce viable estimates during that period.
Previous research has found that Internet search fre-
quencies are a valid and reliable measure of public interest 
in a topic (see Brownstein, Freifield, and Madoff 2009; 
Carneiro and Mylonakis 2009; DiGrazia 2015; Stephens-
Davidowitz 2014; Swearingen and Ripberger 2014; Vosen 
and Schmidt 2011). The research design used in this analy-
sis makes no assumption that all searches for the terms 
Illuminati or Obama birth are performed by individuals 
who believe in the conspiracy; it does assume that the over-
all search frequency for these terms is correlated with both 
interest in each respective conspiracy and receptiveness to 
believe in each conspiracy theory. Previous research has 
found that while search data are not well suited toward esti-
mating certain population parameters due to the unrepre-
sentative nature of the sample, it is effective at measuring 
public interest in topics and is thus well suited to measuring 
public interest in conspiracy theories (DiGrazia 2015).
The data are arbitrarily normed as Google does not make 
absolute search volumes accessible to the public. While the 
norming is arbitrary, it has been adjusted to be consistent 
both across states and over time, making values between 
states and years directly comparable (for details on this 
method, see DiGrazia 2015).
Independent Variables
Time Variant Variables. Unemployment rate is measured as 
the average of the official unemployment rates for each state 
over each two-year time period. These data are obtained 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Time Invariant Variables. The percent white variable is the 
U.S. census 2009 estimate for the percentage of each 
state’s population identifying as white. A time invariant 
measure of this item is used as it is unlikely to change 
radically over the timeframe of the study. The percent 
Obama variable is taken from the Federal Election Com-
mission and is the percentage of votes received by Barack 
Obama in each state during the 2008 presidential elec-
tion. This variable is intended to measure Democratic 
partisan affiliation and political liberalism in the state. 
The immigration variable is taken from the U.S. Census 
Bureau and is a measure of the number of foreign immi-
grants received by each state between 2000 and 2009. 
This item is intended to measure how much demographic 
change as a result of immigration each state underwent 
during the time period leading up to the study (see 
Table 1 for descriptive statistics of variables).
Analysis. This study uses longitudinal regression analysis 
employing generalized least squares (GLS) estimation to 
predict state-level Google search traffic for the terms Illumi-
nati and Obama birth with time periods nested in states. An 
autoregressive disturbance term is used in the estimation to 
account for autocorrelation.
Results
The results of the longitudinal regression analyses for 
Illuminati conspiracy theories are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 shows a base model (Model 1) predicting state-
level conspiratorial ideation with state partisanship, immi-
gration, unemployment, population, and percent white. 
There is a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between the share of the vote in 2008 captured by Barack 
Obama and Illuminati–related conspiratorial ideation. Each 
one unit increase in the percentage of the vote claimed by 
Obama is associated with a decrease in Illuminati search 
frequency equal to .422 (p < .001). Additionally, the state-
level unemployment rate is positively and significantly 
associated with search frequency for terms related to the 
Illuminati. Each one unit increase in the unemployment rate 
is associated with a predicted increase in search frequency 
equal to 2.458 (p < .001). The state-level immigration rate 
does not have a significant effect on Illuminati-related 
search volume. Finally, the results show that, consistent 
with previous individual-level research, the percentage of 
each state’s population that is white is significantly and 
negatively associated with Google search rates for terms 
relating to the Illuminati. Specifically, every 1 percent 
increase in the percentage of the state’s population that is 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
T1: 2007–2008 T2: 2009–2010 T3: 2011–2012 T4: 2013–2014
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Illuminati search volume 11.35 1.99 26.94 7.27 70.876 18.771 67.275 13.685
Obama birth search volume 68.07 64.00 67.87 71.46 80.28 78.14 N/A N/A
Percent white 81.74 11.89 81.74 11.89 81.736 11.891 81.736 11.891
Population 5,617.05 6,185.59 5,617.05 6,185.59 5,617.05 6,185.59 5,617.05 6,185.59
Percent Obama 50.48 9.45 50.48 9.448 50.484 9.448 50.484 9.448
Immigration 2.10 1.26 2.096 1.26 2.10 1.26 2.10 1.26
Unemployment 4.82 1.09 8.61 1.97 7.73 1.83 6.06 1.34
Table 2. Regression Results for Independent Variables on 
Conspiratorial Ideation.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Percent Obama –.422*** –.642*** –.419***
 (–4.51) (–4.70) (–4.50)
Immigration .794 .783 1.565
 (.93) (.94) (1.11)
Unemployment 2.458*** 2.496*** 2.221***
 (4.74) (4.88) (4.21)
Percent white –.356*** –.356*** –.355***
 (–5.17) (–5.29) (–5.19)
Population .000482** .000482** .000493**
 (3.05) (3.11) (3.13)
Time 1 –53.13*** –74.41*** –49.05***
 (–29.31) (–8.02) (–15.33)
Time 2 –46.96*** –61.84*** –41.19***
 (–22.32) (–6.87) (–23.59)
Time 3 –.564 –9.052 –4.48
 (–.34) (–1.16) (–1.69)
Percent Obama × Time 1 .422*  
 (2.34)  
Percent Obama × Time 2 .293  
 (1.68)  
Percent Obama × Time 3 .167  
 (1.10)  
Immigration × Time 1 –2.087
 (–1.59)
Immigration × Time 2 –2.462*
 (–1.98)
Immigration × Time 3 2.059
 (1.92)
Constant 98.72*** 109.7*** 98.30***
 (11.97) (11.46) (11.75)
N 200 200 200
Note: t statistics in parentheses.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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white is associated with a decrease in search frequency 
equal to .356 (p < .001).
Model 2 includes the same predictors shown in Model 1 
with the addition of interaction terms between the time 
period dummies and state-level partisanship. The main 
effects of all predictors are substantively similar to the effects 
shown in Model 1; however, there is a positive and statisti-
cally significant effect shown for the Time 1 and democratic 
vote interaction term equal to .422 (p < .05). This indicates 
that the main effect of partisanship is severely reduced in 
Time 1, the period before Barack Obama assumed office. In 
other words, conservative states became much more conspir-
atorial than liberal states only after Obama assumed office. 
This finding seems to support the notion that the perceived 
threat of Obama’s election was a factor that motivated inter-
est in the Illuminati conspiracy theory.
Model 3 includes the same predictors as the base model 
with the addition of interaction terms between the time 
period dummy variables and immigration. Here the main 
effect of immigration (the effect for Time 4) is positive 
though insignificant. The interaction effects for Times 1 and 
2 are both negative, with only the interaction effect for Time 
2 reaching statistical significance (p < .05) with a coefficient 
of −2.46. The interaction effect for Time 3 is positive but nar-
rowly falls short of statistical significance (p = .054). Taken 
together, these results are suggestive of a pattern in which the 
effect of immigration is stronger in later time periods than in 
earlier time periods; however, this effect is not clearly statis-
tically significant. A study with greater statistical power 
might be able to more clearly discern such an effect.
Table 3 shows the results for the longitudinal regression 
analysis predicting conspiratorial ideation relating to con-
spiracy theories surrounding President Obama’s citizenship. 
Only one explanatory variable is consistently significant 
across all three models: Obama’s vote share in the 2008 pres-
idential election. There is a negative and significant effect for 
Obama vote share across all three models, indicating that 
states in which Obama received more support experienced 
lower levels of interest in conspiracy theories surrounding 
the president’s citizenship. The magnitude of this effect is 
similar across all three models, with coefficients ranging 
from –.425 to –.617. Additionally, there seem to be no sig-
nificant interaction effects between time and Obama vote 
share, indicating that the effect of partisanship or ideology 
does not detectably change over the course of the time period 
included in the analysis.
Conclusions
The findings of this study identify several sources of 
social threat that are associated with increased levels of 
conspiratorial ideation on the state level as measured by 
Google search patterns. Specifically, with respect to con-
spiracy theories regarding the Illuminati, the findings 
show that higher rates of unemployment are associated 
with higher levels of conspiratorial ideation over the time-
frame of the study. Additionally, the findings show an 
effect for state-level political affiliation. However, this 
effect is not constant over time and seems to indicate that 
conservative states became more conspiratorial, even with 
respect to non-explicitly partisan conspiracy theories, 
than liberal states after President Obama assumed office. 
This supports the hypothesis that partisans respond to 
political threat with increased interest in conspiracy theo-
ries. The effect of immigration seems ambiguous, with 
some evidence of a growing effect over time, though this 
effect is not clearly established in the data at conventional 
levels of statistical significance. There is also an effect for 
race, with states with larger white populations searching 
for Illuminati conspiracies at lower rates. Previous 
research suggests two possible interpretations for this 
finding: Non-whites may be searching for conspiracy the-
ories at higher rates than whites or whites might be 
responding to racial threat from larger non-white popula-
tions. While it is not possible to disaggregate these using 
state-level data, the inconclusive results for immigration 
do not suggest a strong effect for racial threat. Finally, a 
much more limited set of predictors was identified for 
conspiracy theories surrounding President Obama’s citi-
zenship, with only partisanship having a significant effect.
Table 3. Regression Results for Independent Variables on 
Conspiratorial Ideation.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Percent Obama –.617*** –.425** –.617***
 (–5.64) (–2.68) (–5.60)
Immigration –.0181 –.00635 .535
 (–.02) (–.01) (.40)
Unemployment .52 .471 .459
 (.88) (.79) (.75)
Percent white –.136 –.137 –.136
 (–1.69) (–1.69) (–1.69)
Population –.00014 –.00014 –.00014
 (–.76) (–.74) (–.73)
Time 1 –2.896 13.24 –1.207
 (–1.14) (1.28) (–.31)
Time 2 –13.56*** –.456 –11.95**
 (–7.09) (–.05) (–3.26)
Percent Obama × Time 1 –.322  
 (–1.61)  
Percent Obama × Time 2 –.259  
 (–1.32)  
Immigration × Time 1 –.889
 (–.57)
Immigration × Time 2 –.739
 (–.50)
Constant 111.6*** 102.3*** 110.9***
 (11.24) (8.94) (10.98)
N 150 150 150
Note: t statistics in parentheses.
**p < .01. ***p < .001.
8 Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 
Taken together, the results of this analysis support the 
hypothesis that macro-level social conditions and struc-
tural social changes can induce feelings of threat and inse-
curity that lead to higher levels of conspiratorial ideation. 
These findings also demonstrate that some sets of con-
spiracy theories are much more flexible than others, hav-
ing a much broader set of predictors. In this sense, 
conspiracy theories like the Illuminati serve as genetic 
templates for conspiratorial belief upon which any group 
can project their anxieties or insecurities. As such, sepa-
rate effects for partisanship, economic stress, and demo-
graphic change are identified in the model predicting 
belief and interest in the Illuminati. Other conspiracy the-
ories, such as those surrounding the citizenship of 
President Obama, emerge as responses to specific events 
by particular groups and do not seem to be influenced by 
unrelated sources of threat.
This research builds on individual-level findings in prior 
research that have found an association between threat and 
conspiratorial belief and begins to forge an understanding of 
the social conditions that can lead to increases or decreases 
in the overall prevalence of conspiracy theories within soci-
ety. Understanding the social origins of conspiratorial belief 
is increasingly important given the widespread belief many 
such theories enjoy among the public and the prominence of 
many such conspiracy theories in our political discourse. 
While many conspiracy theories are harmless, they can also 
obfuscate important political events, decrease political par-
ticipation, and drive support for misguided and potentially 
dangerous policies.
Appendix
Table A1. The term Obama birth is used to measure interest in 
conspiracy theories surrounding Obama’s birth and citizenship 
as it has a high overall search volume and, based on the related 
terms provided by Google Trends, seemed to be associated with 
the broadest set of related conspiratorial terms. Related terms 
are shown.
birth certificate 100
birth certificate obama 100
barack obama birth 20
barack obama 20
obama birth control 5
fake birth certificate 5
obama abortion 5
obama birth date 5
obama partial birth 5
obama birth kenya 5
Author’s Note
The data and code used to produce the analysis will be made avail-
able on my personal website upon publication.
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